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2017 - 2018

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Bringing The Online In Line With
Human Rights

INACH

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Executive Summary

This report dives into the data collection of INACH and its members of the last year, which in turn leads to the establishment of trends within the field of cyber hate. Those are the following;

- The **top four hate types** are the following: **Racism** at 21.26%, a minor drop from last year's 22.19%, **antisemitism** at 19.99%, also a minor drop from 21.38%, **anti-Muslim hate (i.e. Islamophobia)** at 16.37%, another minor drop from 17.98% and finally **anti-refugee hate** with a larger drop from 15.18% to 11.30%.
- The **bottom four hate types** (none of which reach 10% of the totality of hate types) are the following: **xenophobia** (6.96%), observing a minute rise from 5.85% last year, **anti-Arab racism** (7.15%) that also rose from 5.23%, **homophobia** (3.28%) that virtually stayed at the same level as in our previous Report (3.08%) and **anti-Roma hate (i.e. anti-Ziganism)** (1.39%) that also hardly changed from 1.46%.
- Concerning the **Web 1.0 platforms**, their ratio has slightly dropped from the previous year, which means that now less than three quarters of all complaints registered on Web 1.0 platforms by our partners were registered on **websites** (69.26%). They are still followed by **forums** (25.36%) that have seen a major rise since last year's 14.92%, and **blogs** that observed a medium drop from 9.87% to 5.38%. This means that of all cases on older type platforms, more than a quarter were recorded on forums, a major 10 per cent rise.
- Regarding **Web 2.0 platforms**, the first of the three main platforms is **Facebook** whose ratio has risen slightly even further from 42.39% to 43.98% keeping its first place from last year. There has been a change though in the second place, where **YouTube** has taken over **Twitter** due to Twitter's substantial fall from 24.1% to 17.81%, whilst YouTube virtually stayed at the same level (21.63% this year and 21.35% in the last).
- About the **legality of instances of cyber hate**, the absolute majority of collected cases were deemed illegal by our partners (70.86%), a 10 per cent drop from last year (81.38%). Yet, almost 30 per cent of instances of online hate speech fall outside of national laws, international directives and EU framework.
- In regard to the **removal rates**, in 2016-2017 **websites** removed 52.36 per cent of content which has gotten slightly better this year, with a removal rate of almost 58 per cent. The biggest shift observed was regarding **blogs** and **forums**. These removed 56.86% and 23.64% of cases respectively in the last year. This year forums removed 71%, whilst blogs removed 21.21%. Concerning social media, **Facebook** removed 60.16% of cases, a five per cent fall from last year (65.05%), **Twitter** only removed 51.48%, another major decrease from last year's 59.26%, and **YouTube** is the only one that managed to not just maintain its fairly acceptable removal rate of 74.43% from last year, but it even managed to raise it by more than 1.5% to 76%.

This report will give an in-depth analysis of the causes and consequences of those trends.

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I. Introduction

INACH is doing quite well. But the world is not. Hate speech, fake news and false information are on the rise almost everywhere. Left- and right-wing extremism. Islamism. Terrorism. Ultra - nationalism. A full - frontal attack on liberal democracy is in process. Extremists are taking over, while moderates in the centre find it increasingly hard to be heard or be taken seriously, and to supply solutions for the problems of our age. Formerly progressive mainstream parties are becoming toys of antisemites or of those who hate Muslims, refugees and migrants. New protest movements arise, in their zeal attacking free speech, e.g. at Universities. Anti - EU sentiments. Brexit. A European population that increasingly does not understand anymore why the EU was founded and that it has kept us secure during the last 72 years is rising. Generations growing up without basic knowledge on history are becoming the norm. Democracies in the East are going back to old evils, like the national pastime of persecuting Roma. All these issues create a dangerous mix.

Fighting cyber hate is simply an ongoing battle. New issues arise every single day as technology advances, as more and more people have access to computers, and as our lives are more and more governed by the internet. INACH's work is continuous, and at times it may seem that after taking one step forward we are forced to take two steps back. This is especially the case as we observe the rise of hate coming from both the extreme-right and -left. This leads some to say: "If the leaders of important countries and parties can behave like this, why can't I?". Misconceptions are therefore plaguing this world, where hate speech is mixed up with free speech, the lines are blurred, and good role models become scarce. Those misconceptions are coupled with fake information which infest the online sphere. People must now question everything they see and hear, everything can be faked, and anyone can be manipulated whether they are aware of it or not, especially through the online public sphere. Questioning everything can be exhausting, and giving in to manipulation, and mostly fear, is somewhat understandable in an age where walls are being built rather than bridges. Moreover, everything we see on the news is only about killings and violence, very rare are the occasions where positive news is reported. This then feeds into our fears and makes us forget that we should not fight against each other but rather join hands and fight side by side.

But things are not all bad. People increasingly demand to be told the truth, which forces big players such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to re-evaluate their strategies, for the better. This is where INACH's work flourishes. Collecting data is the primary way of exposing the truth. It is the first step in taking action. Without understanding where the problems stem from, there is no solution to be found. In this report we take a look at the data we collected from our many members to sketch an idea of where things are going wrong. After looking at the data we then take a peek at where things are at for our network. We look at the past year and at the coming ones. Although the fight might be frustrating at times we will continue to grow, to make our voice heard, and to make sure every individual's rights are equally protected online.

II. Methodology and Issues Faced

The data collection for this report took place between May 2017 and May 2018. Since our previous project that provided the data for our last Annual Report ended in December 2017, our data collection had to change slightly for 2018. The data analysed in this Report was still provided by INACH's member organisations residing in multiple EU countries. However, until the end of our previous project, the data came from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. Since January 2018, however, this has changed slightly and the quantitative data for this year was provided by our members in Austria, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia. This obviously causes some issues with comparing this year's numbers to the previous Report. However, it also has a positive side, since the situation in Eastern Europe is finally included. Yet, we also have to mention that the data sets from our Western European members (ZARA, LICRA and jugendschutz.net) are much larger than their Eastern European counterparts'. Active Watch's (our Romanian member) data set only includes numbers on homophobic cases on Facebook due to a project they ran and Spletno Oko's (Slovenia) data set, even though it is a lot more mixed than Active Watch's, is far smaller than the ones from Western Europe. Still, INACH secretariat collected data from these partners on a monthly basis using both quantitative and qualitative methods and we received quantitative data from more countries than qualitative data. The qualitative data set therefore includes answers from Austria, France, Germany, the US, the UK, Romania, Slovenia and Israel.

The qualitative data was collected through a Microsoft Word document that asked the following questions from the partners:

- Please provide a short paragraph about emerging or new drivers (e.g. refugee crisis, Daesh terrorism, etc.) of cyber hate in your country.
- Please provide a short paragraph about emerging or new trends (e.g. new target group, growing role of a certain online platform, growing hate against a certain community, etc.) within cyber hate in your country.
- Please provide a short paragraph about emerging or new tools (e.g. memes, conspiracy theories, fake news stories, etc.) used by people to spread cyber hate in your country.
- Please tell us about conferences you organised, campaigns you launched, reports or papers you published on cyber hate; and counter-narratives or counter-speech you use to combat the phenomenon.

As one can see, these questions cover most of the first half of this report that discusses emerging drivers, tools used by extremists to spread hate online and societal trends that can be observed

within the field of cyber hate. It also provides the backbone of the chapter about our activities at the end of this report that sums up our partners' fight against online hate speech. The quantitative side of the data collection was done through a Microsoft Excel table that collected numerical data from our partners based on the cyber hate cases they closed during the previous calendar month. Through this table, INACH secretariat collected data on hate types, i.e. how many cases a certain partner had in that month that falls under some pre-set umbrella terms. Due to our methodology in general, these umbrella terms were the following:

- Racism
- Xenophobia
- Anti-Roma hate
- Anti-Muslim hate
- Anti-religious hate (anything but Islamophobia)
- Hate against non-religious people
- Anti-Arab racism
- Antisemitism
- Anti-refugee hate

Since some cases are not clear-cut and can fall under multiple hate types, INACH and its partners decided to include such cases within all hate types that they fit under and then count them as two or three cases (or as many cases as hate types they fit within). For instance, if a case was antisemitic and homophobic, it was included in the data set under both antisemitism and homophobia and then counted as two cases in the combined number of cases for that month.

The second category that INACH collected data on was the number of cases on different online platforms. We recorded cases on Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 platforms both separately and together. These platforms are the following:

Web 1.0	Web 2.0
Websites (comments on websites included)	Facebook
Forums	Twitter
Blogs	YouTube
	Google+

	Instagram
	Vimeo
	Dailymotion
	Tumblr
	Pinterest
	Snapchat
	Telegram
	VK.com
	Other

The third category was the legality of cases that our partners handled. Online hate speech is a very contested phenomenon for obvious reasons. Hence, all nation states and supranational bodies handle and regulate instances of hate speech differently. Also, NGOs, such as our partners, often find themselves in situations where there is online content that is highly offensive, discriminatory or hateful, yet it does not violate the laws of the country they reside in. That is why including this category was important, to give a picture of unsanctioned cyber hate in order to highlight loopholes in the legislature. Therefore, in this category, INACH collected the number of cases that were deemed illegal by the national law of given country and cases that were not deemed illegal.

The fourth category was the actions that our partners took against instances of cyber hate. This included the following subcategories:

- Sent to police
- Sent to prosecutor's office
- Sent to other state authority
- Request for removal
- No actions taken

Just like with the hate types, some cases fell under multiple categories, thus they were included in all categories they fit into and then counted twice or thrice depending on how many categories they were included in.

The fifth and final category of INACH's data collection were the number of removals and non-removals on all platforms that have been mentioned above.

Within all these categories, INACH also produced percentages and thus ratios. Hence, we know the ratios of different hate types, the ratios of the prevalence of different platforms and the ratios of the removal rates on different platforms. Although everything might seem clear-cut and straightforward based on this chapter so far, the issues that INACH has faced during the data collection period have to be mentioned here. The most pivotal problem that INACH had to face and solve is the extreme volatility in the numbers collected. Our project partners have differing focuses within the field and their capabilities and funding differ vastly from one another. Hence, INACH secretariat received higher number of cases from some partners and lower numbers from others. Also, the collected data is influenced by the focus of the different partners. Some are more focused on antisemitism, others are more focused on anti-Muslim hate, etc. The data is also influenced by local idiosyncrasies, such as forbidden symbols in Germany. Our member included such cases under the category of racism if these criminalised symbols were of Nazi or fascistic in nature, and they included them under 'hate against non-religious people' if they were the symbols of banned Islamist organisations, a Daesh flag for instance. Furthermore, the data INACH collected is not anchored to any outside phenomenon and it is not controlled but perfectly random. We did not control the incoming numbers in any way and we did not tie the numbers to any outside factor, such as demographics. Hence, weighting the data was impossible, because it would have been too arbitrary, and the weights would have had to be measured for all partners, for all months and for all categories, causing the data analysis to be too chaotic and almost based on happenstance. Therefore, weighting the data was ruled out by our analysts and INACH decided to use moving averages to smooth out the figures and be able to unearth trends from the volatile data pool.

It was decided to use a 3-point interval for calculating the moving averages. The reason for this was that our analysts found that a 3-point interval is the sweet spot between the data being extremely volatile and therefore hard to analyse and the data being far too smoothed out artificially and thus representing reality less than ideally. Due to the aforementioned issues and solutions, the trends discussed in this report are based in the moving averages of the ratios of the different hate type categories and removal or non-removal rates. This way, INACH believes, our data give a fairly good overview of cyber hate and trends within the phenomena for Europe, especially Western Europe. Yet, we firmly believe that conclusions can be drawn on the phenomenon in general on a European level, on trends within the phenomenon and on the practices of social media companies when it comes to content removal from their platforms.

III. Drivers, Trends, Tools

As mentioned previously, over the course of this year we have received data from many members of INACH on the topic of drivers, trends and tools. The drivers, representing real world events, leading to the emergence of certain trends in online hate speech, which were, in turn, spread, emphasized and enabled by certain tools. This year we have received data from different members than we had in the previous year. The new countries in question are the UK (Community Security Trust, CST), the US (Southern Poverty Law Center, SPLC), Slovenia (Spletno Oko), Romania (Active Watch) and Israel (Israeli Students Combating Antisemitism, ISCA). As for the countries that were already on the list last year, we have France (LICRA), Austria (ZARA) and Germany (jugendschutz.net). Our network is constantly growing, and this allows a different outlook on the issue of cyber hate. We are including a few of the many examples diffused by our members, which will serve to give an understand regarding what leads to cyber hate.

1. Drivers and Trends

We will first take a look at the drivers and trends that our members have reported. According to CST one of the main drivers was the antisemitism crisis in the Labour party. According to them, that crisis was followed closely by the media and received great political attention, which then led to the conversation being brought up online. Along with that came a lot of online abuse, namely on Twitter and Facebook. Moreover, the promotion of antisemitism was fuelled by the increasing appeal of conspiracy theories and fake news, which can possibly be linked to the emergence of populism as well as the election of Donald Trump in the US, particularly on YouTube. Interestingly, a shift to the platform Gab (which is believed to allow hate speech) from some social media trolls who have been suspended from Facebook or Twitter was observed.

SPLC noted that the main driver of cyber hate in the United States remains immigration. This has increased due to the Trump administration's policy changes that attack both legal and illegal immigration. On June 30 the largest gathering of far-right street activists since Charlottesville in August 2017 descended on Portland, Oregon, which was declared to be a riot by the authorities. During that event the group SPLC-designated hate group Proud Boys gang-beat several people. Far-right activists are also beginning to promote a nationwide demonstration called "National March Against Far-Left Violence" planned for August 18. More so, SPLC found that targets generally represent "leftists," feminists, journalists (the online far-right celebrated a recent mass murder in a newsroom outside Baltimore, Maryland), and immigrants, particularly Muslims. Furthermore, Facebook has improved its policy around hate groups, though it's yet to aggressively enforce them. Reddit's CEO has even said that it's "[impossible](#)" to consistently enforce hate speech rules.

In France, LICRA explored the French #metoo movement named #balancetonporc, which started after journalist Sandra Muller used #BalanceTonPorc to denounce a television executive's inappropriate advances. Thanks to this movement, victims do not stay silent anymore and the number of complaints greatly increased in the beginning of 2018. However, criticism appeared following the public open letter co-signed by Catherine Deneuve in January in *Le Monde*, which argued that the French movement #BalanceTonPorc was turning into a witch hunt threatening sexual and artistic freedom. This was one of the drivers of online sexism. In March 5 people were killed and 16 others injured in a terrorist attack in Trêbes in the south of France after a gunman claiming allegiance to Daesh took hostages in a supermarket. A French police officer, Arnaud Beltrame, was killed after voluntarily swapping places with a hostage. This sparked a wave of online hate directed at Muslims. Besides, France won the Football world cup in Russia in July 2018. This led to many racist comments which emerged after this victory regarding the colour of the skin of the French football players, the team being called an "African" team. Lastly, the AFO group, "Action des forces opérationnelles" or in English "Operational Forces Action", a far-right group of extremists, were found to be in possession of 36 weapons as they were planning to attack French-Muslim citizens including women wearing hijab's, imams as well as Muslim singers. Regarding anti-migrants trends the popular belief of the so called "migratory submersion" or "Great replacement theory" gained in popularity. Lastly, anti-Muslim/anti-Arab trends emerged mainly against women wearing hijab and symbolic elements like the Arabic language in school etc.

As stated in Spletno Oko's report, the recent refugee crisis still has an impact on online hate speech in Slovenia, with the focus now being on the "negative impact" of migration in Slovenia and Europe. Politically oriented media use any negative event as proof to condemn Muslim refugees as well as their culture difference, which then lead to very aggressive online comments regarding and against this minority group.

ZARA specified a few examples from Austria; one of the examples was about the first baby born in the new year being traditionally celebrated as the "New Year's Baby", which is a longstanding tradition which always received a lot of attention. In 2018 that baby had parents of Turkish origin. A photo of the baby and the parents was published in Austrian newspapers, in which the mother was wearing a headscarf. This event caused cyber hate not only against the baby and the family, but against Muslims in general. Around that time ZARA documented more than 50 hate comments related to the birth of the baby. There has even been a criminal sentence of one of the perpetrators (sentencing the person for incitement to hatred, § 283 of the Austrian Criminal Code, to 3 months unconditional imprisonment and another 6 months on probation). ZARA actually found that the majority of cases reported were hate comments against refugees or Muslims. Women were often the targets of online hate, as well. The Austrian government brought up the idea of banning headscarves from kindergartens and schools, which caused heated discussions about Muslim

children and especially girls and women. This led to even more hate comments about women wearing headscarves. Additionally, ZARA noticed that many hateful comments were posted on the social media pages of national newspapers.

In Romania, Active Watch explained that the main driver in 2018, as well as in 2017 was the campaign for changing the Romanian constitution which would define marriage as the union between a man and a woman (instead of the current situation where the union is between spouses). This generated a wave of hate speech against LGBTQI+ people, who were portrayed as being a threat to heterosexual families and children who are in the process of exploring their sexuality.

In Germany, jugendschutz.net explored the fact that the Social Media channels used by extremists to spread hatred and promote their ideologies became increasingly diversified. Right-wing extremists used Discord to address young users more and more. Their method is to use their profiles on other Social Media platforms which they then link to their discord channels and by promoting them through memes and videos. Another Social Media platform increasingly used is Instagram. Right-wing extremist present themselves as "hip" and then discreetly spread explicit right-wing extremist content and propaganda. They base their activities on the typical behaviour of Instagram users and post so called "personal moments" from their everyday life which makes right-wing extremists seem approachable, thus reaching a huge number of followers. Islamists are also using Instagram for spreading propaganda. They focus on using seemingly innocuous, aesthetically staged photos of everyday life as bait to attract young users to their profiles which serves as an introduction to the Islamist ideology. Islamists also use Instagram "stories" for their propaganda which automatically disappear after 24 hours, making their content difficult to monitor.

ISCA noticed a decrease from December to January regarding the antisemitism content regarding the US declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel and the Tamimi teenager. In January, this content was barely published or shared, and antisemitic content was more generic. More so, the Arab world links Saudi Arabia to Israel and the United States, which is represented as a partner to murder and crimes, which it claims Israel is committing. To go even further the belief that an economic incentive that motivates the Jews and tempts the Saudis to "betray" the Arab world is spread to enhance antisemitism. In April, the following worldwide events led to an increase in the publication of antisemitic content, mainly from the extreme right: the attack in Syria, tension in the Gaza Strip, and the state's independence celebrations, and the celebration of neo-Nazis of the birthday of Adolf Hitler.

2. Tools

To go one step further in the understanding of the spread of online hate, looking at the tools that were used are also interesting. SPLC took a closer look at [QAnon](#) (a far-right conspiracy theory group) which remained in high circulation. More troublingly, a dramatic rhetoric about an impending 'coup' and civil war was found on the far-right online platforms and has recently begun to spread in the mainstream conservative media, though an InfoWars story about July 4th being the starting date of a new civil war.

LICRA found that regarding antisemitism, Jérôme Bourbon from Rivarol magazine tweeted the following "School friends, if, during your classes, they brainwash you about the Holocaust, tell them about the Palestinian blood, about the massacre of unarmed civilians. Do not let anyone accept this, please react, revolt, do not be Judeo-submissive". Jérôme Bourbon is denying the Holocaust and claims that everything taught in schools in relation to the Holocaust is a lie. Moreover, the burial of Simone Veil, a French lawyer, politician and Holocaust survivor, at the Pantheon, sparked many antisemitic tweets and posts against her because she was Jewish as well as for her work for the legalization of the abortion in France. Regarding anti-migrant trends, new concepts inspired by the theory of the Great replacement have been promoted by far-right groups and political leaders. For example, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, leader of the right-wing political party "Debout la France" (an ally of the National Front during the last presidential elections) spread his concept of religious "colonization of France" by migrants around. In addition, a lot of hate against women wearing hijab was also seen through the following; each time a Muslim woman was seen wearing a hijab on TV her profile would be promoted and criticized by extreme right groups such as the fascist-sphere in online groups.

Spletno Oko observed that the politically oriented media mentioned above often use fake news stories showing foreigners as violent criminals, leading the public to perceive them as threats. Another promoted idea is that Slovenians are being treated unfairly as "refugees are getting too much help, while our people are in need").

Jugenschutz.net found that in January, the death of German jihadists Dennis Cuspert, a known rapper who had joined IS, was used by the Islamic group to glorify him as a "martyr" and to recruit young people to "follow in his footsteps" and join the militant jihad. Moreover, in February, members of the far-right identitarian movement created the campaign #120db, which exploited the debate about sexual harassment #metoo for their own propaganda. The hashtag was used to post instances of sexual violence (allegedly) committed by refugees or migrants, insinuating that refugees are dangerous. Later, in April, the German Islamist group "Generation Islam" initiated a so-called "Twitterstorm" under the hashtag #NichtohneinKopftuch (meaning #Notwithoutmyheadscarf) to make their messages a trending topic on Twitter. The campaign drew on a debate in Germany about a ban on headscarves in kindergartens and schools for girls under

the age of 14. The Islamist groups argued that this was an attack on freedom of religion for Muslims. Then right-wing extremists tried to use the campaign to their own benefit, using the hashtag to post derogatory and hateful comments about Muslims.

ZARA noted that closed Facebook groups were a common tool to spread fake news in combination with hate comments, as being not public, people feel safer in posting hate comments. As a result, illegal comments are posted more often in closed groups than on public Facebook pages.

ISCA monitored a very active Facebook page with antisemitic posts called “The Movement for the Liberation of Jerusalem”, and reported dozens of posts on this page. ISCA also identified a pattern where, on official news channel pages that share content on Israel or the Jews, there are many antisemitic comments. Regarding the Russian website VK they noticed an increase in the number of Antisemitic accounts not in the Russian language, which use caricatures as a tool.

IV. Data


1. Introduction of the Collected Data

In this chapter a snapshot of the data will be given in order to familiarise the reader with the situation in Europe as far as cyber hate goes. All categories introduced in the methodology chapter will be introduced and discussed here. However, the reader must keep the issues discussed in the methodology chapter in mind, since some of the conclusions that will be drawn in this chapter based on the data collected in the past year are heavily influenced by those issues; such as the manpower of our partners and the type of cyber hate they are focusing on. Still, this chapter will provide an extensive and in-depth overview of the phenomenon.

A) Hate Types

Based on our data collection, four hate types can be seen as predominantly prevalent in Europe, especially in Western Europe. These hate types were dominant all throughout the past year, and even though they might have changed places from one month or quarter to another, their place in the top four was never really in question.

These hate types are the following: Racism at 21.26%, a minor drop from last year's 22.19%, antisemitism at 19.99%, also a minor drop from 21.38%, anti-Muslim hate (i.e. Islamophobia) at 16.37%, another minor drop from 17.98% and finally anti-refugee hate with a larger drop from 15.18% to 11,30%. Some of these hate types are showing downward trends, but they are and have been far above all other monitored hate types throughout the year. We will call them the top four hate types. (The category of 'Hate against non-religious people' will be ignored here due to the facts mentioned in the methodology chapter, it is a Germany specific category to begin with, which means that we have hardly any data on it from other countries and it also includes cases of forbidden symbols that is also very country specific. Ergo, including it would only skew the data and make it less relevant on an EU level, the same is true for the category of 'anti-religious hate [anything but Islamophobia]').




Following the top four hate types, we have the bottom four hate types. These hate types are far below the top ones that this year make up less (almost 69%) of the data collected by INACH than last year when they made up more than 76 per cent. None of the bottom four hate types reach 10 per cent and only two of them go above 5 per cent, just. These hate types are the following: xenophobia (6.96%), observing a minute rise from 5.85% last year, anti-Arab racism (7.15%) that also rose from 5.23%, homophobia (3.28%) that virtually stayed at the same level as in our previous Report (3.08%) and anti-Roma hate (i.e. anti-Ziganism) (1.39%) that also hardly changed from 1.46%.

That being said, it is perfectly clear that general racism and antisemitism were the most neuralgic issues in the past year based on INACH's data. Closely followed by Islamophobia and anti-refugee hate. anti-refugee hate is a special category that was created out of necessity, even though - as a hate type category - it had been virtually unseen before the so-called refugee crisis that started in 2015. Since then, however, it has clearly been a major issue, although a diminishing one, that will be discussed in detail later in the report.


As the data show, there has been hardly any major changes as far as hate types go. Although three out of the four top hate types all observed slight decreases, whilst anti-refugee hate has seen a larger one; these categories are still unmatched by any other hate type that INACH collects data on. They even kept their respective places from last year. This shows that, even though there might be sudden shifts in trends and new types of hate might emerge suddenly, there are certain things that do not change so often or rapidly. And such dogged beasts as racism, antisemitism and anti-Muslim hate will not disappear or diminish too much from one year to another. (As it has been mentioned, anti-refugee hate will be discussed in a later chapter, just as in our previous report)

B) Ratio of Complaints per Online Platform

When it comes to platforms that online hate speech spreads on the most, social media is unbeatable. However, Web 1.0 platforms are still in the game. If we take out Web 2.0 platforms from the data pool, one can see that websites are still a magnitude above forums and blogs. However, their ratio has dropped somewhat from the previous year, which means that now less than three quarters of all complaints registered on Web 1.0 platforms by our partners were registered on websites (69.26%). They are still followed by forums (25.36%) that have seen a major rise since last year's 14.92%, and blogs that observed a medium drop from 9.87% to 5.38%. This means that of all cases on older type platforms, more than a quarter were recorded on forums, a major 10 per cent rise.



As far as social media platforms go, there is a clear triumvirate that rules the whole market, and therefore gives the biggest surface to cyber hate and extremist propaganda. The first of the three main platforms is Facebook whose ratio has risen slightly even further from 42.39% to 43.98% keeping its first place from last year. There has been a change though in the second place, where YouTube has taken over Twitter due to Twitter's substantial fall from 24.1% to 17.81%, whilst YouTube virtually stayed at the same level (21.63% this year and 21.35% in the last).




The fall in Twitter's ratio is most likely due to two factors: 1) A small rise in recorded cases on some smaller platforms, and 2) we have received almost no cases from jugendschutz.net concerning Twitter. They said that the platform just did not really come up in complaints to them during the first half of 2018 and there are no other specific reasons for this phenomenon. Almost 90 per cent of registered instances of cyber hate came from these platforms in the previous year. This ratio has fallen slightly to just above 83 per cent if Web 1.0 platforms are taken out of the

data set. Facebook's dominance is even more prevalent, since one can see that the ratio of instances of cyber hate registered on it is almost twice as big as the second platform, Twitter.


The puissance of the triumvirate is underpinned by the fact that all other social media platforms are dwarfed by them quite literally when it comes to registered cases of cyber hate. The fourth largest number of cases were registered on Instagram this year (4.45%) instead of Google+ that has seen a larger drop from last year from 4.3 per cent to 2.23%. The fall in the number of recorded cases on Google+ is not that surprising, since, as far as we know, Google is shutting the platform finally down. However, the cases recorded on Instagram almost quadrupled from last year, which is definitely a warning sign for the platform. Besides the two Russian platforms, Telegram and VK.com that are both above 2 per cent (mainly based on data coming from Germany), the only other category with an above 3 per cent ratio is the 'Other Social Media Sites'. This shows that extremists might be migrating slowly to newer, less policed platforms to spread their hate.

If the two data sets are combined, namely the ratio of cases registered on Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 platforms, it becomes perfectly apparent that social media dominates the online public sphere, and thus most instances of online hate speech are registered on these platforms. Even with the data from Web 1.0 platforms added in, the three social media giants (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) are responsible for more than 60 per cent of registered cases.



However, this is where we see the first real shift in numbers from last year, where more than 70 per cent of all cases were recorded on these three platforms. The numbers show that both Web 1.0 platforms and smaller social media platforms have grown since last year. This finding also underpins the assumption that extremists might be looking for new outlets that are less policed. This also might be the first sign that the Code of Conduct signed by the biggest companies and the European Commission and the German law that threatens the companies with major fines if they do not remove illegal hateful content might be working.

C) Legality of Registered Instances of Cyber Hate




The legality of instances of cyber hate is minor but a quite complicated issue. As it can be seen, the absolute majority of collected cases were deemed illegal by our partners (70.86%), a 10 per cent drop from last year (81.38%). Yet, the fact that almost 30 per cent of instances of online hate speech collected by the experts at INACH and its partners fall outside of national laws, international directives and EU framework

decisions is a bit worrying. Especially, since one of our biggest data providers, jugendschutz.net did not provide any data on cases that were deemed legal, due to their inhouse policy. This signals gaps in the legislature that ought to be remedied by either EU bodies or the member states themselves. These cases of cyber hate are just as vile, hateful and capable of inciting hatred or radicalise people, yet - due to contextuality or some other loophole in the body of law - they are not penalised in any way, and therefore they are very hard to get removed from the online public sphere.

D) Removal Rates on All Major Platforms

As far as classical online platforms go, getting hateful content removed from them is extremely hard. This definitely shows in the recorded removal rates. In 2016-2017 Websites removed 52.36 per cent of questionable content and this has not changed much since then, although the situation

has become a little bit better with sites removing almost 58 per cent of the hate speech reported to them. However, there has been a major shift when it comes to blogs and forums. These removed 56.86% and 23.64% of cases respectively in the last year. This year forums removed 71%, a whopping rise, whilst blogs removed 21.21%, a substantial fall. Showing that even if there are shifts in removal rates, the situation as a whole has not changed too much. The reasons behind this is probably twofold. Minor Web 1.0 platforms are not as prepared or well-funded enough to maintain an army of admins and moderators as social media companies. The second reason, which is also a major issue, is the fact that some of these platforms are specifically brought to life and maintained to give a surface for online hatred. Most of these are hosted on servers in the US and therefore it is almost impossible to get anything removed from them.



However, social media companies with all their money, data and manpower are also far away from perfect. INACH and its partners have to face massive issues due to vague policies and codes of conduct put forth by these companies. They also implement their own rules often highly arbitrarily. Moreover, their stance on different hate types or modes of online hate speech vastly differ from country to country, even though they are supposedly using the same rule book. That is why the numbers we see are not too far from being abysmal. Facebook removed 60.16% of cases, a five per cent fall from last year (65.05%) - not a great trend -, Twitter only removed 51.48%, another major decrease from last year's 59.26%, and YouTube is the only one that managed to not just maintain its fairly acceptable removal rate of 74.43% from last year, but it even managed to raise it by more than 1.5% to 76%. These numbers are fairly low and show the great divide between NGOs that fight for a more inclusive online public sphere and social media companies that try to paint themselves as the knights in shining armour protecting free speech online. However, the fact is that these companies are money making machines first and foremost and they therefore resent the idea of spending more money to earn less money. And, essentially, that is what NGOs and

some governments try to get these companies to do. Hire more people and devote more resources to remove content that - if left online - make them money.


INACH, naturally, is not arguing that the removal rate should be a 100 per cent. But INACH has several member organisations that have dozens of experts working for them. These experts are well trained in the recognition of hate speech and international and national hate speech laws. Thus, when they approach these platforms to remove something, they do that with the knowledge that the content is definitely hate speech *and* most likely illegal. Still, there can be differences of opinion, but removal rates should most definitely reflect these facts and therefore they should be somewhere around 90 per cent (at least).

2. Emerging Trends in the Data

In this chapter light will be shone on trends that emerged within the field of cyber hate based on INACH's data collection efforts. Trends in hate types, furthermore removal rates on the three major social media platforms will be examined closely to give a general idea about the most singled out targets of hateful online content and the hardships NGOs face while trying to clean up the online public sphere. Some conclusions about the targeted vulnerable communities and the trends within the hate type data will also be drawn.

A) Trends in Hate Types


Racism is one of the two most generic hate types within our data set, the other one being xenophobia. However, due to the focus of our project, our methodology excluded several types of hate that otherwise could be classified as racism. Therefore, this data does not include cases that fall into the following categories: Anti-Roma hate, anti-Arab hate, anti-refugee cases and antisemitic cases. This gives us a narrower picture as far as racism as a category goes but, on the other hand, it gives us a more in-depth and precise picture of the hate types that were examined separately (these will be discussed later in this chapter).



As it has been mentioned, racism is the leading hate type category based on the collected data, as almost the quarter of all cases handled by INACH and its partners fall into this category. This dubious first place was also underpinned by a slow but steady upward trend in the previous year, where the ratio of such instances of online hate speech rose from around 20 per cent on average to 25 per cent on average. However, this trend has turned around somewhat since. The number of racist cases kept growing on average until November 2017 and then started declining fairly rapidly from the highest level of 32.59% on average to a lowest of 14.66% in February 2018. Yet, if one takes a look at the ratio of racist cases in the last three months, a clear change can be seen where the ratio of such cases rose back above 20%. So, the dip that INACH observed in this type of cases did not last long, since the number of racist cases started rising back again almost immediately after our previous Annual Report. Thus, we were right in 2017 when we wrote that: [...] *“since this [racism] is one of the two most generic categories and definitely the most prevalent, it is highly unlikely that it would fall further. Hence, INACH is predicting that - on average - the ratio of racist instances of cyber hate will stay around or above 20 per cent and the continuation of the upward trend or the stagnation of the numbers around this level is much more likely than a fall.”* And this is pretty much what happened. Such cases stayed around 20 per cent and then started rising basically until the end of 2017, where - again - another dip happened that started to turn into a rise around April 2018. This INACH is predicting the same things as last year.

Xenophobic cases fall under the second most generic hate type category that was used during data collection. Unlike racism though, xenophobia is among the four bottom hate types. Its ratio among all hate types only twice surpassed 10 per cent, and on average it stayed firmly under 10 per cent during the data collection period, which is a minor rise from last year when it never surpassed 8 per cent on average. This fact is also buttressed by a trend of virtual stagnation in xenophobic cases, where their numbers moved - on average - around 10 per cent with a dip to almost 4 per


cent in November 2017 and an exceptionally high outlier of more than 18 per cent - not on average - in January 2018.



This outlier obviously raised the average number of these cases too, but it still did not cross 10 per cent due to a whopping fall in the absolute number of these cases back to around 4 per cent. This brought down the average number of xenophobic cases to around their usual level on average. INACH's prediction is the same as in last year: xenophobic cases will stay among the four bottom hate types and keep moving up and down within the range they have been fluctuating during the past year. This is probably due to the fact that there are very few cases that clearly fall under the xenophobia umbrella and cannot be categorised as racism or some other hate type. Therefore, its numbers will most likely stay low.


Anti-Roma cases are the first hate type category where issues in our data collections have to be discussed. As it has been mentioned in the methodology chapter, the Eastern or Central Eastern European members of INACH provided far smaller data sets than their Western European counterparts. Furthermore, they only started providing data in the beginning of 2018 and none of our CEE and EE members that provided data focus specifically on hate directed towards the Roma communities in their respective countries. Therefore, the number of anti-Roma cases that were collected were quite low. (53 cases out of more than 3800 cases). Now, racism towards the Roma community is not a singularly Eastern European issue, however it is definitely a more prevalent and pressing problem in countries with a high Roma population, such as Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania.

Looking at the line chart below, it is clear that - almost exactly like last year - anti-Roma cases never really went above 3 per cent on average (a minor 1 per cent rise from last year) and fluctuated immensely in an absolute sense. Furthermore, INACH did not register any such cases in the last month of our previous reporting period and the first two months of the current one.



The only outlying month is March 2018, when the absolute number of anti-Roma cases reached more than 5%, only to fall back to around 1% again in the next month. Hence, INACH would not go as far as drawing conclusions based on this data.


Anti-Muslim hate can be found on the complete opposite of the data spectrum. INACH was able to collect an ample sample size and this hate type category is firmly within the top four hate types. We observed a downward trend for this hate type during our previous data collection period, where such cases slowly fell to around 15 per cent during the last four months.



This trend continued into our current data collection period, during which anti-Muslim cases stayed steadily around 15 per cent and then between 15 and 20 per cents until November 2017, where they started increasing suddenly to reach almost 33 per cent in December, just to fall back suddenly to an exceptionally low 5 per cent in the beginning of 2018 and then settle back more or less into their usual range at around 15 per cent on average. Thus, INACH is predicting that the


ratio of anti-Muslim cases will most likely keep on fluctuating between 15 and 20 per cent, staying firmly among the top four hate type categories.

Anti-Arab hate is intimately linked to the previously discussed anti-Muslim hate, however it is also quite separate. It is a collection of cases where people are being attacked solely for being of Middle Eastern or North African descent. However, it very often overlaps with Islamophobia, since most people and extremists link these two things together.




Yet, unlike Islamophobia, anti-Arab hate is in the bottom four and its ratio among all hate types. There was a small upshot during the last month of our previous data collection period and the first two months of the current one, where the number of these cases went above 10 per cent. This is the only period, however, when something like this happened, and the numbers fell back to their usual range quite quickly to start fluctuating again between 4 and 6 per cents, then between 2 and 4 per cents around the end of 2017 beginning of 2018, just to rise back again to the range between 4 and 6 per cents in late winter, early spring of 2018. Putting some minor volatility aside and the fact that our sources of data somewhat changed during this data collection period, the trends observed here are highly unlikely to change in the near future.

Homophobia is the second hate type after anti-Roma hate that is suffering from a small sample size. None of INACH's project partners focus specifically on homophobia and therefore the collected numbers are fairly low (125 cases out of 3806). Still, it can be said that homophobia - as far as our data set goes - is among the bottom four hate types and it stayed very steadily around 3 per cent on average throughout our previous data collection period. This has not changed much during the period that we are examining now. The ratio of homophobic cases stayed roughly around 3 per cent on average until February 2018, where a sudden and fairly steep upward trend occurred. This trend is still ongoing at the end of our current data collection period.




In our previous Annual Report, we wrote that: *“If no additional data will be collected during the next period, it is highly unlikely for this to change, and homophobia will stay at very similar levels to where it is right now.”* We were mostly right. The number of homophobic cases stayed steady for most of our next period. Yet, this sudden upward trend in such cases is a curious phenomenon and it might change the scenery for the next year. However, we would still argue that it is much more likely that the number of these cases will come down and settles back into its usual range.

Antisemitism on the other hand is still the second most prevalent hate type within INACH’s data set. This is especially worrying because the first one is racism, a very generic and wide hate type, whilst antisemitism is very narrow and specific. However, we have to note here that our French project partner, LICRA, is specifically focused on antisemitism (but not exclusively). Hence, the numbers INACH receives from them are always quite “antisemitism heavy” and therefore the French data skew the sample somewhat, but not to a sufficient extent to make it unusable.



Antisemitism was a hate type with a very clear and steep upward trend, that raised this hate type's ratio from around 15 per cent on average to above 25 per cent during our last data collection period. This 10 per cent rise was unparalleled by any other hate type in the data set. This suggested that antisemitism was one of the most prevalent and worrying issues in the phenomenon that is cyber hate. However, this changed somewhat during our current period of data collection. Antisemitism is still the second biggest hate type and it is still amongst the most worrying issues in Europe. Yet, a slight downward trend can be observed in the number of such cases and their average ratio amongst all other hate types fell to around 15 per cent around the end of 2017 and it basically stayed there during the examined months 2018. However, a small rise can be seen in such cases in April 2018 that might signal antisemitic cases rising again back to their previous level that INACH observed in our previous Report.

Anti-refugee hate is still a fairly new phenomenon within online hate speech. This category contains cases of people being attacked online based solely on the fact that they are refugees irrespective of their religion, sex, ethnic background, etc.



Very little of this type of hate could be observed before 2015, but it had to be included in INACH's data collection because it became one of the most virulent types of hate on the internet by 2016 and it still has not disappeared, even though the refugee crisis of 2015 is firmly behind us. Yet, due to the rise of far-right parties and authoritarian regimes, such as in Hungary and Poland keep exploiting the plight of refugees for political gains; the refugee issue still stayed on the agenda both on national and on EU levels.


That is why anti-Refugee hate is still in the top four hate types according to INACH's data, but it has the lowest numbers among the top four. Especially, because a very steady decline could be observed in this hate type during 2016 and 2017, where it fell from around 18 per cent on average to around 10 per cent, almost halving its ratio among all hate types. This trend did not continue,

however. During our current data collection period we observed a very mild rising trend in such cases. Yet, the trend could be best described as stagnation, since the ratio of these cases on average stayed around 10 per cent for months and then rose to around 12 per cent between January and March 2018. INACH is very curious to see if we argued correctly in our Debate Starter chapter in our previous Annual Report that this type of hate will fizzle out slowly due to the diminishing numbers of new refugees trying to enter the EU. The trend that can be seen here might say that we were incorrect. We will discuss this more in-depth in a later chapter.

B) Trends in Removal Rates

Content removal is among the top goals of INACH and our partners. Cyber hate is corrosive, discriminative and more than capable of radicalising people. Hence, the removal of such content from social media sites is of paramount importance. However, since there is an obvious clash of human rights (between human dignity, freedom from discrimination and freedom of speech) and a clash of interests between NGOs and social media companies. The removal rates on the major social media platforms are far from ideal.


Facebook's removal rates were mostly ok, but they still fluctuated immensely and a slight, but very steady downward trend could be observed on average in the previous year. As one can see on the chart below, Facebook's removal rates started out abysmally in the beginning of our current data collection period, which was a continuation of the downward trend that we observed in the previous period that led to the platform's lowest removal rate, below 40 per cent, that was recorded in May 2017.



This carried over into June 2017 when suddenly the company's removal rate shot up and reached 80 per cent once more after July 2016. Following this, the platform's removal rate started to settle


after some fluctuation and more or less steadily stayed between 60 and 70 per cent on average. This led to the slight upward trend observable on the chart. However, this trend is not enough to allow one to have a completely positive attitude about the company's performance in removing hateful content, since their average removal rate level is still only around 70 per cent. This is definitely a step in the right direction if it is compared to the previous year, but overall, there is plenty of room for improvement.

“Twitter is worse than Facebook in removals and they also present a downward trend. Even though their highest removal rate in February 2017 was at almost 90 per cent, their lowest one was at only 20 per cent in November 2016. A ratio much lower than the lowest of Facebook. Moreover, they remove less cases on average and their numbers fluctuate much more.” We wrote in our previous Annual Report and there is not much to add to this if one looks at the chart below.




The company's removal rate is by far the worst out of the three major social media platforms and they fluctuate in a very volatile manner, suggesting great inconsistencies in applying their policies for removing cyber hate. Furthermore, even their average removal rate mainly falls between 30 and 40 per cent, which is extremely low.

YouTube was far closer to Twitter than to Facebook when it came to removal rates during our previous data collecting period. Their numbers fluctuated in a very volatile manner, their lowest removal rates were between 40 and 50 per cent. However, they were the only major social media platform with an upward trend. Even though the company started out with very worrying levels of non-removal in May and June 2017, their numbers started growing and after some volatility they settled on a continuation of the upward trend that INACH observed in our previous Report.



This meant that YouTube's removal rate on average were mostly around 80 to 90 per cent, which is absolutely outstanding, and one can only hope that this level of commitment to keeping the platform cyber hate free will continue in the next year. However, there are some ominous signs that that might not be, insofar as the company's numbers started falling again during the final two months of our data collection period, signalling a negative shift.

On the final chart below, the moving averages of the removal rates of the three major social media companies are being compared with trend forecasting included. Last year, with all the volatility in the monthly numbers and rates, and all the differences between the removal ratios of the different companies, their removal rates - on average - did, somewhat, move together. However, that has changed mostly for this year. Facebook and YouTube did move together until around the end of last year, but then Facebook started to diverge and fall far below YouTube's removal rates.



It seems that Facebook might turn this trend around and start to join YouTube again somewhere around the 80 per cent removal rate stratum, but that is yet to be seen. However, Twitter completely fell behind and diverged far away from both Facebook and YouTube.

V. A Continuation of Our Debate Starter from INACH's Previous Annual Report


“The steady decline of anti-refugee hate, although this might change during the coming month, due to worrying news coming out of Italy and the EU’s less than firm grip on the issue that signals a long and arduous process of negotiations that try to solve the issue and will ultimately probably fail, gives an opportunity to start a debate on effective approaches to achieving an open and inclusive society, and effectively countering cyber hate. As one can arguably extrapolate from INACH’s data - just as in all other online phenomena -, “fads” and sudden trends can be observed in online hate speech. Offline societal, geopolitical, national and political issues are major and instant drivers behind cyber hate. Thus, hate types, such as anti-refugee hate, can appear suddenly and then slowly cool down and almost disappear as the drivers behind it slip into the background.

This might suggest that most people who create or share hate online are not radicalised dogmatic neo-Nazis or extremists. They most likely have not completely internalised the hatred that they spew against certain people or communities. If there is a new emerging political issue that involves the proverbial “Other”, may that be refugees, Jews, Muslims or Romani people, they jump on the bandwagon and they project their insecurities and fears onto the “Other”. Hence, only a subset of the creators of cyber hate actually do what they do because of strong ideological convictions. Others, probably the majority, are “just” trapped in the eons-old “Us” versus “Them” mentality that - per definition - “others” and securitises people and communities that dress differently, worship differently or differ culturally/physically from the members of the majority community. Thus, their “hatred” towards a certain group is most likely superficial, not internalised and abates rapidly if the online climate changes, at least towards that specific minority group.


This signals that to efficiently combat these issues, one has to focus on the underlying causes, i.e. “Us” versus “Them” mentality, “othering”, securitisation and the fear of identity loss. It also means that first and foremost the notion of what it means to be the member of a certain European nation (e.g. being French, German, Spanish, etc.) has to change. Europeans cannot define themselves anymore through the colour of their skin and/or their religion. They have to realise the excluding nature of these signifiers and come up with others that can really work as umbrellas that all can fit under. European values could be a great starting point. The respect for human rights, democracy, liberalism, secularism, etc. are all ideas and ideals that are inherently inclusive and independent of ethnic background, religious beliefs or skin colour. Obviously, immigrants and members of minority communities also have to subscribe to these ideas and - due to cultural differences - that will also be hard work on their part (and on the part of European societies). However, there are hardly any other options to create healthy and unfragmented European societies through integration that is not forced assimilation.

INACH does not argue that the above is an axiom within the field of cyber hate, but it is definitely something that is worth examining further, in order to be able to target and combat cyber hate in a more efficient way and develop counter techniques that incorporate these realisations. That is why we presented these ideas in a form of a debate starter chapter and that is why we welcome experts and other stakeholders in the field to think about these hypotheses. INACH will try to provide the needed space and time in the future to facilitate this debate.”

This is what we wrote in our previous Annual Report when the numbers and trends in anti-refugee hate looked like this in the chart below:



And this is what we have observed since:



Based on these numbers, if we compare the two charts, one might argue that INACH's predictions were arguably a little bit too optimistic. Anti-refugee hate still has not dissipated completely - although we did not say it would in a year -, and it also did not decrease further. Yet, we can still argue that we were partially right. Cases of anti-refugee hate basically stagnated during our current data collection period and, apart from two highly outlying months (November 2017 and January 2018), their ratio did not even get close to the level of the previous period. On average, such cases stayed between the 10 and 12 per cent stratum and the slight upward trend is mainly due to the two outlying months. However, an upshot in these cases could be observed at the end of the current period, therefore we would withhold the predictions about what might happen with the number of anti-refugee cases in the future. Yet, based on the data and the political climate, we would still maintain that the remedies that we suggested in our previous report are still arguably the best to combat hatred against vulnerable minority groups, because the hatred towards them mostly grows when politicians, people with power and a platform and extremists fan the flames deliberately due to true extremist beliefs or simple political calculation. The far-right sets the agenda on immigration and Islam in the whole of the EU, while more and more the far-left loses itself in antisemitic rhetoric. Slowly everybody starts copying these extremists. If democrats cannot address and change this, then the hatred against refugees and all other minorities will continue and might even grow stronger.

VI. Steps Forward for INACH and Its Members

Regarding INACH itself, much has happened in the last year and there is much to come as well. This can be explored firstly through the new framework partnership that we have with the EU since January, and what that means for our fight against cyber hate. We are also proud to announce a sharp increase in the number of our members which will benefit all of us in spreading our message to an ever-growing audience which in turn can enable real change to be made. Some of the explanation below has already been touched upon in our previous report about the state of cyber hate, so we will only summarize the main topics briefly.

As stated above, the greatest news this year is that our partnership with the EU will continue. This will enable us to keep pursuing the efforts we have made in the last 2 years, and build on our previous project, by expanding the use of our online hate database, work hand in hand with our members, old and new, leading to more efficiency when fighting against cyber hate, and coming up with new and innovative ways to tackle the issue. For instance, this has led to one big accomplishment this year which was our [Annual Conference](#) that had for theme “Hate Speech, Recruitment, Terrorism”. On October 11, 78 representatives of INACH member organizations, public institutions, academia and IT-industry came together to exchange ideas and discuss the correlation of hate speech, recruitment and terrorism, which was made possible through the Internet and its dissemination of hate speech leading to the recruitment for violent causes and the facilitation and proliferation of terrorism much easier. Analogies and differences between the most common motivations, strategies and methodologies were then mapped by international experts which lead to an understanding of how the internet is being used as a such as tool. The nature, motivations for -and results of terrorism, and possible countermeasures were also discussed.

We held multiple trainings to make our members familiar with our online complaints database, which is full of data that we use to write reports and analyses that help us create awareness and promote attitude change in society by influencing the public, social media companies and international institutions aiding us in lobbying for international legislation. We also held an additional training concerning the monitoring exercise, which will take place, just as it did last year. These trainings took place at INACH's office in Amsterdam and made sure all the network was on the same page and given sufficient information to be as effective as possible. During those trainings new ideas flourished as exchanges from members were encouraged. That is the beauty of such an international network, as thanks to all different perspectives in this melting pot of cultures we can find innovative solutions.

In addition, we have published new reports such as our paper on the [State of Cyber Hate](#) which gave an overview of the issue along with recommendations as to how to tackle it. That report particularly enabled us to take a look at the offline political and legal environments that shape cyber hate, the most prevalent hate types, platforms, trends in removals and such; and finally, our

hopes for the future. That is why in this present report we will not discuss any recommendations per se as they are mainly outlined in that specific report already.

Lastly, we will be one of the leading organizations in the execution of the yearly monitoring exercise which we touched upon in detail in last year's [Annual Report](#).

Those are a few examples of what has happened during the year, and concerning what is about to happen, the thing we are the most excited about are our upcoming counter speech modules that we are currently developing. We will aim at synergy by working with our members to deliver the best possible curriculum to tackle cyber hate. Our two focuses will be the youth on one hand and the police on the other. We will be looking at what is lacking at the moment in terms of proficient ways for those groups to grasp the issue and to remedy it. This will add a new dimension to attaining our goal of bringing the online in line with human rights.

Last but not least, another great news is that our network is rapidly growing. We are now up to 28 members and growing. We have expanded even further outside of Europe, reaching the US and Argentina, and have gained many Eastern European members which allows us to have a better understanding of the issue at hand when looking particularly at Europe as a whole. We have even gained an organization focusing solely on issues faced by the Roma people (Romea) which was a minority group that we lacked data on. Of course, our goal is to keep growing and expanding on topics where we still lack full data, such as the LGBTQI+ community for instance or the Muslim community, and we are working hard at making that happen. A growing network does not only mean a more thorough understanding of the phenomenon but also a larger audience to whom we can spread the word to and encourage debate and raise awareness. For example, one of our campaigns which was very popular was about spreading awareness concerning the misconception between free speech and hate speech. As many of our members are active on social media, sharing such campaigns on their own accounts multiplies the number of people that we can reach. In other words, the main advantage of a growing network is simple: we are stronger together. If we want to achieve our goals, we need to fight hate in a holistic way through novel methods and do it hand in hand with as many people as possible.

Regarding what our members were up to this year, here are a few examples: CST launched the [#AntisemitismHurtsMeToo](#) campaign in February, as part of the Create Against Hate project set up by Facebook. Facebook initiated the Create Against Hate project in order to inspire young creators to collaborate with charities and produce a campaign to combat hate speech and extremism online. This campaign urged the audience to celebrate Britain's diverse and multicultural society and spread the unifying message of fighting antisemitism together. SPLC worked on an ongoing basis with various companies to give them information on hate groups using their platforms. For instance, they sent information on Proud Boys to Patreon and they were banned, and PayPal took out two skinhead groups. The organization is also working with Facebook on Act for America and

Red Ice Radio. They have also finalized a set of model policies for tech companies produced by a coalition of civil rights groups with the help of Center for American Progress (CAP) and Free Press, called Help Tech Stop Hate. Spletno Oko organized a conference named “Hate speech from the perspective of law enforcement and social networks” on June 6. During that conference, three lecturers described their procedures and existing dilemmas in moderating and prosecuting hate speech online. During the same month, the organization also published a [handbook](#) for reporting hate speech on social networks which describes the procedures for reporting hate speech, with an emphasis on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Zara presented its [Racism Report 2017](#) during the March 21st Press conference, which included a section on racist incidents in Austria, occurring on the internet, as well as a number of articles dedicated to cyber hate in Austria. Moreover, another example was Zara’s April 17th social media campaign with a video on “How to report on Facebook” (within a series of videos on how to report hateful comments and posts online). One last example is jugenschutz.net which published multiple papers; [“Islamists between beauty bloggers and pop stars”](#), [“Praxisinfo: #NichtohnemeinKopftuch”](#) (published in German), [“2017 Bericht: Islamismus im Netz”](#) (Annual report on Islamism on the internet 2017; published in German) and [2017 Bericht: Rechtsextremismus im Netz](#) (Annual report on far-right extremism on the internet; published in German). All the accomplishments of our many members can be found through the links to their websites on their individual pages on our own [website](#).

All in all, things are going in the right direction. Of course, there is still much to be done but that is what we are here for. Firstly, understanding the issue with the collection of data and then presenting this data to a growing audience and new platforms (our new website, our new YouTube channel, and our many members’ platforms) will make sure our message is heard. This can and is already leading towards changes in policy, such as the Code of Conduct, the monitoring exercises, the new German law called the Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (NEA) and the Communication by the EC, which are all discussed in detail in last year’s [Annual Report](#), our [Strategic paper](#) and our paper on the [State of Cyber Hate](#). Now, the only thing left to do is to keep up the good work.

VI. References

The data (both qualitative and quantitative) in this report was collected from INACH members. Until the end of 2017, we received quantitative data from the following members:

jugendschutz.net (Germany), the Inter-Federal Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (now Unia) (Belgium), Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus-Arbeit (Austria), Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme (France), Movimiento contra la Intolerancia (Spain), Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet (Netherlands) and Meldpunt Internet Discriminatie (Netherlands).

From January 2018 we received quantitative data from the following members:

jugendschutz.net (Germany), Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus-Arbeit (Austria), Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme (France), Spletno Oko (Slovenia) and Active Watch (Romania).

Until the end of 2017, we received qualitative data from the following members:

jugendschutz.net (Germany), the Inter-Federal Centre For Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (now Unia) (Belgium), Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus-Arbeit (Austria), Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme (France), Movimiento contra la Intolerancia (Spain), Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet (Netherlands) and Meldpunt Internet Discriminatie (Netherlands).

From January 2018 we received qualitative data from the following members:

jugendschutz.net (Germany), Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus-Arbeit (Austria), Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme (France), Spletno Oko (Slovenia), Active Watch (Romania), Community Security Trust (UK), Southern Poverty Law Center (USA) and Israeli Students Combating Antisemitism (Israel).

The following INACH papers were referenced in this report:

INACH's Annual Report 2016-2017: <http://www.inach.net/inach-annual-report-2016-2017/>

The State of Cyber Hate: <http://www.inach.net/the-state-of-cyber-hate/>

Policy Recommendations to Combat Cyber Hate: <http://www.inach.net/policy-recommendations-to-combat-cyber-hate/>

INACH's Annual Conference Report 2018: <http://www.inach.net/inach-annual-conference-2018/>