

Impuls #4

Gender-sensitive
approaches to minor
returnees from the so-called
Islamic State

Dr Gina Vale



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Introduction

In February 2016, footage of a British four-year-old boy makes international headlines. Wearing military fatigues and a black headband with the Islamic State (IS) insignia, he remotely detonates a car bomb killing three men as punishment for alleged espionage (Islamic State 2016). This footage serves a dual purpose. It both realises and inspires the radicalisation of the group's "next generation". For years, IS and its supporters have celebrated the roles of minors in its inter-generational war. However, it is not a coincidence that the majority of children featured in the group's propaganda – especially militarised or violent scenes – are male. Gender ideals have shaped the group's vision of society and its warcraft. Whether as soldiers, executioners, or domestic auxiliaries, boys' and girls' contributions to the "caliphate" were consistently celebrated, albeit clearly delineated.

As of July 2019, up to 6,577 foreign minors from at least 50 countries had travelled to or been born into IS' self-declared "caliphate" (Cook and Vale 2019, 38), with unknown numbers of local Iraqi and Syrian children kidnapped or enticed into its ranks. In all cases bar one, national-level data for IS-affiliated minors is not disaggregated by gender.¹ Yet now, with this limited data and understanding, world leaders and international organisations must grapple with how to manage and respond to the needs – and potential threat – of these IS-affiliated minors.

This article employs a gender lens to consider the experiences of minors in IS' "caliphate" and the implications for their potential return from Iraq and Syria. First, it reviews the gender-specific roles and activities assigned to boys and girls across age levels in the group's territory. Second, it highlights the implications and diverse support needs that derive from these experiences and minors' subsequent detention in prisons and securitised camps in north-eastern Syria. Third, it proposes how child welfare can and should be prioritised at the point of return and reintegration, without sidelining security concerns.

Gendered Roles and Activities in the "Caliphate"

Across its public propaganda, internal documentation, and supporter testimonies, IS presented its binarised vision of manhood and womanhood (Vale 2019, 2–3). On the one hand, men and boys were lauded for their virility derived from and manifested in their military prowess. On the other, women and girls were expected to embody IS' feminine ideals of purity, chastity, and modesty. In practice, these ideals were reflected in a policy of "caliphate"-wide segregation through which roles, rights, and spaces were delineated according to gender.

As IS mandated that women's and girls' rightful place is the home, there is little evidence of girls' activities within the group's territory beyond official edicts and propaganda. Although some reports indicate incidents

¹ The exception is Tajikistan; information on this case and corresponding data is available here: (Cook and Vale 2018, 25)

of girls participating in violence (O'Brien 2016), marital and domestic tasks were the primary responsibility of the group's hyper-feminine "pearls" (Winter 2015, 18, 24). An unofficial manifesto of the all-female Al-Khansaa' Brigade outlined that it was "legitimate" for girls to marry from the age of nine, with young men expected to be no more than 20 years old (Ibid, 24). However, IS marriage certificates and members' social media accounts attest to matches between young girls and far older adult men.

Despite a policy of early marriage, IS advocated for and promoted girls' education, at least in theory. However, in practice, girls' education was deprioritised. Attendance was dependent on adherence to the group's strict female dress code and gender-segregation of teachers and students (Islamic State 2014a). By February 2015, the Ministry of Education in al-Dijla Province announced the closure of girls' schools on account of insufficient female staff (Islamic State 2015a).

In contrast to the seemingly delicate "pearls", young boys were encouraged to adopt public and militarised roles. IS' "caliphate" became an immersive site of masculine socialisation and desensitisation to violence (Vale 2018, 13–15). In both public and private spaces, violence became ingrained in boys' upbringing – whether through school curricula and training camps (Gramer 2017), public preaching and propaganda viewings (Winter and Haid 2018, 2–3), or forced attendance at amputations and executions (Horgan et al. 2017, 654).

Practical training crystallised IS' militarised ideals and bolstered compliance. A personnel list from a military training camp in Homs Province indicates that 41 per cent of registered fighters were aged under 18 (Islamic State 2015c). These boys – and those featured in IS' training and execution videos – have been named the "Cubs of the Caliphate", reinforcing both their youth and might as the group's "lions of tomorrow" (Watkin and Looney 2019).

IS' immersive proto-state structure promoted boys' activism from a very young age. Toddlers and pre-schoolers were included in outreach events whereby they could don military fatigues or wave an IS flag or banner (Vale 2018, 21). Reports also point to the use of very young boys as community informants who were even encouraged to share incriminating information about their own relatives (Meines et al. 2017, 18). As they got older, pre-teen and teen boys were expected to take on more active roles in the group's state-building and military operations. Though they were largely trained, armed, and deployed in much the same way as adult men, young and adolescent boys' cheap labour, ideological malleability, and physical characteristics made them ideally suited to frontline deployment. This included weapons manufacturers and couriers, suicide operatives, frontline combatants, and executioners. On a rarer basis, adolescent boys were also trained as preachers and clerics (Islamic State 2015b).

The proactive recruitment and participation of minors reflects IS' ambitions for inter-generational endurance. It also reinforces the group's efforts to re-order local age-hierarchical norms. Both boys and girls were encouraged – or forced – to adopt adult roles and responsibilities prematurely, whether through marriage or militancy. These responsibilities and experiences have adverse consequences for children's post-conflict recovery and shape their support needs.

Implications and Support Needs for IS-Affiliated Minors

IS' "caliphate" was a society at war. As such, during and beyond their time in IS territory, minors face multiple and compounding risks. These include trauma and psychological stress, physical and sexual- and gender-based violence, disrupted family relationships and social development, and limited or interrupted access to shelter, education, food, and basic resources. Although all minors must be assessed in accordance with their individual circumstances and experiences, factors including gender, age, duration and level of affiliation with the group all intersect to shape their vulnerabilities and support needs.

Gender inequality is the root of early marriage for girls. Marriage contracts issued by IS courts served to verify the bride's virginity status and formalise the exchange of dowry and bride price (Vale 2020, 37–38). While the groom, the bride's guardian, and two (male) witnesses provided fingerprints and signatures for formal consent, a blank contract template from al-Raqqa omits space for the bride's authorisation altogether (Islamic State n.d.). This bureaucracy undergirds a wedding and subsequent marriage without the bride's full and informed consent. The physical, psychological, and developmental implications of these unions have been well-researched. Girls who marry before the age of 18 face a higher likelihood of sexual and domestic violence (Ahinkorah et al. 2021), in addition to reproductive health risks and maternal mortality resulting from (forced) pregnancy (Nour 2009). Indeed, IS' prohibition of contraception was designed to encourage fertility and procreation for its cause (Islamic State 2014b). The result is a concerning rise in adolescent maternity, with some cases of infants born to teenage girls whose experiences in IS territory have also left them orphaned and widowed (Sutton 2016).

Research shows a negative correlation between child marriage and girls' education. Gendered roles and expectations of motherhood, and the corresponding enforced domesticity by groups such as IS, result in high numbers of girls dropping out of school (Delprato et al. 2015) – a trend reflected in IS' deprioritisation of girls' education. The immediate and long-term consequences include social isolation and reduced support and social networks, as well as loss of knowledge and skills to attain employment and economic independence. Designed to ensure male dominance through the protection of and provision for delicate "pearls", the group has worked to ensure women's and girls' dependency on male heads of households endures beyond its "caliphate" era.

While all minors are exposed to traumatic stressors in a war zone such as IS' "caliphate", militarised training and frontline operations increase the likelihood of combat-related physical and psychological trauma among boys. Their deployment as frontline soldiers, guards, and weapons couriers positioned them in the line of fire from ground forces and aerial attacks. As such, IS-affiliated boys are likely to suffer conflict-related injury or disability (Johnson and Whitman 2016), the long-term physiological and psychological consequences of which may hamper rehabilitation.

Exposure to traumatic or stressful circumstances places IS-affiliated minors at high risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In a review of 21 studies of 3,984 child soldiers, Betancourt et al. (2013) found that prevalence rates of PTSD symptomology ranged from 27 per cent to 99 per cent of children, with greater levels in former child soldiers than in never-conscripted children. A recent study of Yazidi boys who

had been kidnapped and forcefully conscripted by IS found high levels of PTSD, anxiety, depression, and somatic disorders (Kizilhan and Noll-Hussong 2018). Similar trends can likely be expected among foreign and local IS-conscripted boys.

Commensurate with age, as boys advanced through IS' ranks, they were expected to progress from bystanders, to accessories, then to perpetrators of violence. Their training in IS' military camps was not purely physical but also focused on fostering appetitive aggression: the transformed perception of violence from frightening, to normal, and even to exciting or arousing (Maclure and Denov 2006). Appetitive aggression has been linked to a higher propensity for violent behaviour, and thus poses a challenge for reintegration and return to communities' moral and social bounds on the use of violence (Hermenau et al. 2013, 2). In light of IS' increasingly violent and frontline roles for older boys, in addition to longer durations in training camps and operational deployment, it is likely that levels of appetitive aggression would be higher among teen and pre-teen boys.

Even following their departure – either voluntarily or through force – from an armed group's territory, minors are not necessarily removed from adverse circumstances. Now, over three years since IS' territorial collapse, thousands of minors languish in displacement camps and prisons in north-east Syria (Minogue and Yamin 2020, 7). In Al-Hol, the largest camp, approximately 94 per cent of the total 65,000 displaced population are women and children, with 54 per cent under the age of 12 years ('Highlights' 2021). Many lack civil identity documents or were born either in IS territory or the camp without birth certificates, and are therefore at risk of statelessness ('Syria' 2019).

Whether minors' support needs are exacerbated or addressed in these “transitional settings” affects whether they turn toward, or away from, extremism and IS' ideology. Indeed, some IS-affiliated minors may spend more time in displacement or detention facilities than they did in IS territory. Concerningly, the situation in these camps has earned the labels of “mini caliphate” and humanitarian crisis (Zelin 2019). Challenges for children's access to education and development opportunities also continue. Home-schooling has often been the default, enabling continued indoctrination in IS' worldview within the private setting of each tent (Vale 2019, 6).

Minors' continued detention, alongside adult IS supporters, compounds their experiences of deprivation, traumatisation, and indoctrination. Children in the camps have been seen chanting IS slogans in front of makeshift flags (Hall 2019), hurling stones, wielding sharp metal sword-like blades, and issuing threats to “infidels” (Al Abdo and Mroue 2021). Of even greater concern are reports of arbitrary arrest, forced confessions, and torture of young and adolescent boys in Iraqi and Kurdish custody (Becker 2019). The incarceration of these boys is a consequence of their gendered roles in IS as well as the gendered counter-terrorism practices that disproportionately securitise males – both adults and children.

Camps and prisons are no place for children. Gender stereotypes and the securitisation of boys has led to their imprisonment in settings that are likely to exacerbate physical and psychological trauma and reinforce IS' ideology and norms of violence. Meanwhile, girls' deprivation of education and healthcare continues in camps. Continued exposure to violence, deprivation, and extremism risk further harm and hindrance to their rehabilitation.

Reintegration: Balancing Security and Child Welfare

The EU's Counter-Terrorism Coordinator recently labelled IS-affiliated minors as a "ticking time bomb" (Kington 2019). Concerned with the potential security risks, states now wrestle with the political and ethical challenges of repatriation and reintegration. Despite repeated calls from Kurdish authorities, aid groups, and researchers, repatriation rates remain proportionately low. By July 2019, just 25 per cent or fewer of IS-affiliated minors in Syria had returned to their countries of origin (or, in the case of newborn infants, to the country of primary nationality of their parents) (Cook and Vale 2019, 38). States' aversion to repatriation has been met with successful jail-breaks (Margolin, Cook, and Winter 2019) and fundraising campaigns to smuggle IS-affiliated women and their children out of the camps (McKernan, Mironova, and Graham-Harrison 2021).

The long-term security risks of inaction therefore far outweigh those of repatriation and provision of tailored support. Securitisation of minors creates barriers to accessing benefits, rights, and services that are needed to facilitate successful rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Instead, by prioritising children's developmental needs, holistic initiatives that address healthcare, education, psychosocial support, family reunification, and vocational training can foster a safe, stable, and positive environment that is essential for children's transition and stress management (van der Heide and Alexander 2020, 22).

Removal from insecure and radical environments is the first step. Initial evidence suggests that, with the elimination of negative factors of violence or extremist ideology, very young children have been able to positively adapt to their new environment within two or three months (Koller 2021, 13). Moreover, while it may be tempting to discuss or counteract IS' ideology directly, efforts to build an alternate worldview based on positive values and skills would instead foster healthy relationships and normalise life outside of IS and detention facilities. Interrogations, assessments, or therapeutic interventions carried out too soon may risk re-traumatisation and violations of trust ('Child Returnees from Conflict Zones' 2016, 7). Instead, research has shown that education systems play a vital role (Betancourt and Williams 2008). For example, the re-introduction of critical thinking through age-appropriate education and activities not only supports healthy cognitive and social development, but also provides the vital skills to turn away from IS' ideology and worldview (van der Heide and Alexander 2020, 24).

The literature on reintegration of child soldiers and children affected by conflict-related trauma emphasises the importance of positive peer and social networks, especially family reunification (Betancourt et al. 2010). However, the context of IS is not clear-cut. Due to the group's mechanism of familial indoctrination and membership, relatives may have been those primarily responsible for the child's affiliation and travel to the conflict zone. Consequently, in order to minimise continued indoctrination and endangerment, some minors have been removed from the care of their IS-affiliated parent or primary caregiver (either as a condition of repatriation or through incarceration or pre-trial detention) (Dearden 2020).

Separation from family members should only be a last resort undertaken in the best interests of the child. In the case of IS where children may have few social ties, severing these connections may exacerbate trauma (and also hinder the deradicalisation and reintegration process of the adult relative). However, in circumstances where separation is unavoidable, it is essential to identify and unify children with appropriate

caregivers as soon as possible. Avoiding the placement of children into the care of adults sympathetic to violent extremism is most important. Irrespective of whether returning minors are housed with relatives or foster families, it is important to ensure support is provided to the whole family unit. Individuals responsible for a child's care require tailored guidance and training to sufficiently recognise and respond to their needs whilst creating a stable, safe, and "new-normal" environment. This is particularly important to effectively understand and manage disruptive, anti-social, or violent conduct as symptoms of trauma that requires support, as opposed to threatening behaviour requiring punishment.

It is important to underscore that legal recourse may be appropriate in some cases, particularly for older adolescents. However, judicial responses should not preclude rehabilitative initiatives and treatment (van der Heide and Alexander 2020, 33). Instead, these should be considered two parallel tracks to reintegration. Responses should be flexible and tailored on a case-by-case basis, taking into account variances in experiences and vulnerabilities.

Before and after returning to their countries of origin, minors with links to IS are likely to experience stigmatisation and discrimination. Lack of identity documents, treatment within detention facilities, and public and political aversion to repatriation all crystallise the "IS-affiliated child" label, exacerbating a sense of rejection and lack of belonging. Efforts to reduce stigma should focus not only on the individual, but also on their local community and broader society (Wessells 2016). From political rhetoric to community education, information regarding repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of these children should avoid a stigmatising or risk-oriented approach. Shedding the IS label is not to deny or erase minors' past experiences, but instead should promote belonging in the child's new context (Koller 2021, 13).

Conclusions

All minors face trauma and vulnerabilities associated with living in a conflict zone, daily exposure to violence and insecurity, personal loss and bereavement. In addition, IS' transformation of gender ideals and expected behaviours have long-term consequences. Girls face disproportionate risks to their health and their socioeconomic independence from the group's practice of early marriage. Their containment in camps continues their isolation and lack of access to education, and thus hinders their development. For boys, manliness has come to be defined and supported by a psychological reorientation to prefer violence as a means of performative power. As such, boys' military training and combat roles are likely to result in high levels of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Minors' affiliation with IS was a product of their environment and socialisation. Efforts to rehabilitate returning minors should primarily focus on removing negative influences, and enable positive development. Security-first policies are thus conducive neither to recovery nor disassociation from IS' violent ideals. Continued detention or stigmatising rhetoric exacerbates harm and may fuel the grievances that reignite IS' appeal. In other words, securitisation provides no alternative to embodying the "IS-affiliated" label. Instead, initiatives that address healthcare, education, and psychosocial support should be prioritised. A rehabilitation-first approach that holistically responds to each child's individual needs can provide an effective counterpoint to IS' indoctrination and offer a new identity on which to build a positive future.

About the author

Dr Gina Vale is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King's College London, specialising in intersectional analysis of terrorism and extremist violence. Her doctoral research examined the impact of Islamic State's governance and state-building activities on local Sunni Muslim and Yazidi women in Iraq and Syria, for which she conducted extensive fieldwork in internally displaced persons camps in Northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. Her research has been published by *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*; *Small Wars & Insurgencies*; *Conflict, Security & Development*; and *CTC Sentinel* among others.

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Informationen zu KN:IX

Das Kompetenznetzwerk „Islamistischer Extremismus“ (KN:IX) besteht seit Beginn der aktuellen Förderperiode von „Demokratie leben!“ (2020-2024). Es reagiert auf die Entwicklungen im Phänomenbereich und begleitet sowohl die Präventions-, Interventions- und Ausstiegsarbeit als auch die im Themenfeld geführten fachwissenschaftlichen Debatten. Als Netzwerk, in dem die Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft religiös begründeter Extremismus, ufuq.de und Violence Prevention Network zusammenarbeiten, analysiert KN:IX aktuelle Entwicklungen und Herausforderungen der universellen, selektiven und indizierten Islamismusprävention und bietet Akteur*innen der Präventionsarbeit einen Rahmen, um bestehende Ansätze und Erfahrungen zu diskutieren, weiterzuentwickeln und in die Arbeit anderer Träger zu vermitteln. Das Kompetenznetzwerk versteht sich als dienstleistende Struktur zur Unterstützung von Präventionsakteur*innen aus der Zivilgesellschaft, öffentlichen Einrichtungen in Bund, Ländern und Kommunen sowie von Fachkräften etwa aus Schule, Jugendhilfe, Strafvollzug oder Sicherheitsbehörden. Neben dem Wissens- und Praxistransfer zwischen unterschiedlichen Präventionsträgern hat KN:IX das Ziel, mit seinen Angeboten zu einer Verstärkung und bundesweiten Verankerung von präventiven Ansätzen in Regelstrukturen beizutragen.

Informationen, weitere Publikationen und aktuelle Veranstaltungen des Kompetenznetzwerkes „Islamistischer Extremismus“ finden Sie auf www.kn-ix.de.

Über die BAG RelEx

Die Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft religiös begründeter Extremismus, kurz BAG RelEx, ist ein gemeinnütziger Verein. Gegründet wurde sie im November 2016 von 25 zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen, die sich gegen religiös begründeten Extremismus engagieren. Ziele der BAG RelEx sind die Vernetzung, der Fachaustausch und die Weiterentwicklung auf diesem Themengebiet. Mit aktuell 35 Mitgliedsorganisationen steht die BAG RelEx für eine große Vielfalt an Ansätzen und Maßnahmen sowie für langjährige Erfahrungen im Arbeitsbereich. Die BAG RelEx versteht sich als Plattform und Schnittstelle zwischen zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren, Politik und Öffentlichkeit. Die BAG RelEx ist konfessionell und parteipolitisch unabhängig.

Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter www.bag-relex.de.

Bisherige Publikationen des KN:IX

Lakbiri, Assala (2022): Impuls #3: Apokalyptisches Denken im islamistischen Extremismus. Berlin: Violence Prevention Network gGmbH.

Nadar, Maike und Saloua Mohammed M'Hand (2021): Impuls #2: Menschenrechtsbasierte Radikalisierungsprävention – ein Entwurf aus der Sozialen Arbeit. Berlin: Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft religiös begründeter Extremismus.

Brüning, Christina (2021): Analyse #3: Globalgeschichtliche Bildung in der postmigrantischen Gesellschaft. Berlin: ufuq.de.

Saal, Johannes (2021): Analyse #2: Die Rolle der Religion bei der Hinwendung zum religiös begründeten Extremismus. Berlin: Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft religiös begründeter Extremismus.

Rothkegel, Sibylle (2021): Analyse #1: Selbstfürsorge und Psychohygiene von Berater*innen im Kontext der selektiven und indizierten Extremismusprävention. Berlin: Violence Prevention Network gGmbH.

Kompetenznetzwerk „Islamistischer Extremismus“ (2021): Wer, wie, was – und mit welchem Ziel? Ansätze und Methoden der universellen Islamismusprävention in Kommune, Schule, Kinder- und Jugendhilfe, außerschulischer Bildung, Elternarbeit, Psychotherapie und Sport. Berlin: ufuq.de.

Kompetenznetzwerk „Islamistischer Extremismus“ (2021): Handreichung zur digitalen Distanzierungsarbeit Erkenntnisse, Expertisen und Entwicklungspotenziale. Berlin: Violence Prevention Network gGmbH.

Kompetenznetzwerk „Islamistischer Extremismus“ (2021): KN:IX Report 2021: Herausforderungen, Bedarfe und Trends im Themenfeld.

Schubert, Kai E. (2021): Impuls #1: Reflexionen über den Nahostkonflikt als Thema der selektiven und indizierten Präventionsarbeit. Berlin: Violence Prevention Network gGmbH.

Kompetenznetzwerk „Islamistischer Extremismus“ (2021): Online: Beratung und Begleitung in der pädagogischen Praxis. Methodenfelder. Berlin: Violence Prevention Network gGmbH.

Kompetenznetzwerk „Islamistischer Extremismus“ (2020): [KN:IX](#)
[Report 2020: Herausforderungen, Bedarfe und Trends im](#)
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